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From Idealism to Pragmatism
A Matter of Evolution
Willem A. deVries
1 Pragmatism has long been recognized to have close ties to Idealism. Indeed, there have
been arguments that pragmatism must itself be a form of idealism.1 I do not think such
arguments hold up, but I would not deny for a second that there is a deep relationship
between idealism and pragmatism. I want to tell a story about the changing nature of
idealism that makes sense of their relationship without threatening to collapse one into
the other. My story is a history, and idealism’s history began hundreds of year before
pragmatism entered the stage, so I beg the readers’ indulgence: it will take me some time
to set the table before we are prepared to discuss the relation of pragmatism to idealism.
To foreshadow: I take it to be clear that pragmatism has very little in common with the
subjective idealism of Berkeley or the problematic idealism of Descartes; the differences
between  idealism  and  pragmatism  get  blurred  only  because  idealism  underwent  an
evolution that so transformed it, not long before pragmatism emerged, that it might seem
a small step between them. It was, according to my story, the evolved idealism developed
in Germany between 1781 and 1831 that contributed to the formation and development of
pragmatism. Yet pragmatism is a large evolutionary step away from idealism, however
much it retains and utilizes some of the strengths of late idealistic thought.
 
1. Epistemologically-Based Idealism
2 First off, then, I would like to distinguish two different kinds of idealism.2 The distinction
I draw here is rooted in the motivations for adopting an idealist position. One kind of
idealism arises out of epistemological considerations, and has both negative and positive
components. There is a localized skepticism as a negative component, counterbalanced by
positive epistemological and ontological commitments in a different locale. Historically,
it  arises  within  a  Cartesian  framework  that  assumes  that  we  have  direct  and
incontrovertible cognitive access only to our own mental states, often denominated as
ideas. Our knowledge of anything that is not an idea or a mental state is, then, at best
derivative and probable (this is the negative element), rather than primary and certain.
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Since,  on this  Cartesian view,  our own mental  states are supposed (once clearly and
distinctly perceived) to be transparent to us, the positive elements of the position are the
ontological commitment to the being of ideas and the epistemological commitment to our
knowledge of them. If we stop here, we have what Kant attributed to Descartes and called
“problematic idealism” (B274).
3 As Kant notes,  it  is but a further step to declare that our conceptions of non-mental
objects are “false and impossible”; it is certainly the case that they are highly complex
and that we can generate at least apparent antinomies that beset our conceptions of the
non-mental.  If  we thus  strengthen the  negative  aspect  of  the  position into  a  strong
(though still somewhat local) skepticism, while retaining our commitment to the being of
the  mental,  we  get  a  position  that  Kant  identifies  with  Bishop  Berkeley  and  calls
“dogmatic idealism” (B274). 
4 Kant holds, of course, that his own transcendental idealism is neither of these positions.
It dispenses with the local skepticism about the material or external world, for the
argument of the ‘Refutation of Idealism’ is  that our knowledge of our inner states is
interdependent and of equal stature with our knowledge of external or material states of
affairs. But Kant’s transcendental idealism does not dispense with the skeptical element
altogether; rather, it relocates it by drawing a new boundary, not between the inner and
the  outer,  but  between  the  phenomenal  and  the  (really)  real.  We  can  and  do  have
knowledge of the phenomenal, which includes both the inner and the outer, but it is all
inflected with our own conceptual structure and thus not equivalent to knowledge of a
purely mind-independent reality as such, which remains forever out of our reach.
5 Peirce gives us a closely related diagnosis of the idealism that Kant responds to in his
‘Refutation of Idealism’ and notes the extent to which Kant remains caught in the overall
picture that requires some form of direct and immediate presence-based knowledge, which
entraps him in another form of idealism. This analysis – admittedly in texts put together
by his editors, Hartshorne and Weiss – can be found in volume 1 of his Collected Papers (CP
1.35-39). Peirce sketches there his way out of such idealisms, but that is part of a slightly
different story, so I will not pursue it here.
6 Kant denies us any knowledge of a purely mind-independent reality. Yet it does seem a
bit odd to call his position a form of idealism, for he is not, in the end, committed to the
ontological priority or independence of  the ideational,  certainly not  under a standard
interpretation of  ‘idea.’  Concepts (or rather exercises of  concepts)  and intuitions,  his
equivalent to the ideas of his predecessors, are phenomenal entities (they are at least in
time) that are not themselves items of the really real world of things in themselves. Seen
in this  light,  Kant  should have found a  different  name for  his  own position.  Bishop
Berkeley has often been called a “subjective idealist.”3 This was a label that Kant insisted
did not apply to his own position; the main reason for the revisions in the B edition of the
first Critique was to distance himself further from Berkeley’s subjective idealism. Perhaps
Berkeley’s position is, in fact, better called an “constitutive idealism,” because the only
objects  recognized  in  his  ontology  are  minds  and  ideas;  material  objects  exist  only
objectively (in the Cartesian sense) in ideas. Then we could free up the label “subjective
idealism” to describe Kant’s position, namely that all objects of thought and experience
are ‘tainted’ with the structures of our human cognitive framework, so that everything
available to a subjectivity is  ideal  or mind-dependent.  On that reading of  “subjective
idealism,”  the  position does  not  exclude accepting objective  realism as  well,  that  is,
believing in the existence of a mind-independent reality.
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 2. Ontologically-Based Idealism
7 I  promised two conceptions of idealism, and I  haven’t yet discussed the second. This
version  of  idealism is  directly  metaphysical  and  is  not  motivated  by  any  particular
epistemological theses. According to this version of idealism, material things and any
other things that are not minds or their ideas are somehow lacking in being and therefore
not deserving of first-class ontological status. Notice that we could slip the good Bishop
Berkeley  into  this  version,  for  the  kinds  of  incoherence  that  he  thought  beset  our
concepts of material things serve perfectly well to make them unqualified for ontological
commitment. But Leibniz is, I think, a purer case of this form of idealism: material objects
are merely phenomenal in his fully considered view, because they are merely passive, and
anything that is real must be active, something only minds or mind-like items can bring
off, in his view. We can think of Leibniz here as taking a cue from Plato: “to be is to have
power” (Sophist 247e),4 and space, time, and material things don’t measure up; thus, they
are merely ideal. Hegel adopts a different version of this form of idealism. It turns out, on
his dialectical analysis, that material reality and nature do not have the ontological bona
fides;  they  exist  in  order  that  spirit  may realize  itself,  and the  true  measure  of  the
ontologically real is the ability to self-realize.5
8 To the extent that Peirce flirted with what he calls “objective idealism” (CP 6.24-25), I
think we should consider this a flirtation with this second form of idealism.
9 This second form of idealism is unabashedly metaphysical, and it assumes that one has a
firm grasp of the criterion of being. Furthermore, this criterion cannot be purely formal;
it  must  have  some content  to  it  whereby material  things  in  space  and time can be
distinguished from the minds, ideas, or mental states that really exist. As various forms of
materialism, physicalism, or at least naturalism have gained ascendency in recent Anglo-
American  analytic  philosophy,  this  form  of  idealism seems  more  and  more  remote,
because it seems to be getting more difficult to believe that material things are dependent
on the mental rather than the mental being dependent on the material. After all, our
investigations of materiality have been yielding interesting, important, and useful results
for several centuries now, whereas investigations of the mental or ideal, as such, show
comparatively little such progress, at least as of yet. Indeed, much of the progress that
has  been  achieved  in  the  sciences  of  mind  has  come  from the  investigation  of  the
materiality of mind.
 
3. The Contribution of the Substance Framework
10 As I have said, my story is a historical look at the evolution of idealism. To get a fuller
sense of evolution, I am going to cast a glance back to a time before the emergence of
idealism, even if it seems like a detour on our road to understanding the relation between
idealism and pragmatism. 
11 The classical forms of idealism I described in sections 1 and 2 – one a contrast to realism
and one a contrast to materialism – were developed within the general framework of the
Cartesian approach to mind,  and it  is  important that the Cartesians also employed a
substance metaphysics. This is a framework that assumes that the basic entities of the
world are substances, enduring objects with various and multiple properties, each such
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object capable of existence on its own – that is, without being the property of some other
substance. Each substance has a least one essential property crucial to it that determines
its  fundamental  kind,  that  is,  the  conditions  of  its  identity  and  individuation.  This
substance framework, in such an abstract formulation, is itself a formal framework; to be
able to apply it, one needs to specify what kinds of things are substances, that is, what
properties are such as to determine or specify the object possessing them as a substance,
a basic object capable of its own existence independent of inhering in yet some other
object.
12 A  substance  framework  is  not,  on  its  own,  sufficient  to  generate  a  strong  contrast
between idealism and realism (the epistemological contrast) or idealism and materialism
(the  ontological  contrast).  We  need  the  combination of  the  framework  of  substance
together with the New Way of Ideas initiated by Descartes and picked up by his successors
on both sides of the English Channel. A brief look at the Aristotelian interpretation of the
framework of substance makes this clear. 
13 Given Aristotle’s hylomorphic construal of the substance framework, one cannot generate
a clash between materialism and idealism,  because hylomorphism does not generally
allow for minds, for psychai, to be independent existences separable from the matter they
inform.6 Minds are not the kind of thing that could be a primary substance; psychai are
forms that require a matter to inform. An Aristotelian framework is patently realistic,
because it  clearly  recognizes  the existence of  mind-independent  objects.  Within that
framework, the notion that the fundamental reality of things generally is ideal or mental
cannot get off the ground, because (1) not every form is a form of psyche, so there are
things uninfected with the mental, and (2) the Aristotelian stands by the claim that it is
the same thing that thinks that walks, so material reality is unexpungeable.
14 Only once the Aristotelian hylomorphic framework is abandoned can one generate a real
clash between idealism and materialism.  Minds have to be thought  of  as  themselves
substantive entities that stand in contrast to and independent of material entities. Only
then do we get the either/or that makes idealism versus materialism seem like a choice
one is forced to make. Traditionally, we think of Descartes as responsible for this move.
15 We could  rehearse  a  related set  of  arguments  to  show that  it  is  equally  difficult  to
generate  an  epistemologically-based  idealism/realism  contrast,  given  Aristotelian
epistemology, but we will not take the time to do that here. 
16 This  is  significant  in  our  context  here  because,  while  Peirce  was  not  opposed  to
employing the substance framework, with some adaptations, Dewey is far less enamored
of  that  framework,  and  thus  well  inclined  to  dismiss  the  contrasts  essential  to  a
determinate  idealistic  doctrine  –  the  contrasts  to  the  real  and  to  the  material  –  as
misleading and confused, just as Aristotle might have. 
 
4. Hegel as Realist and Idealist, but not a Pragmatist
17 So the realism/idealism and materialism/idealism disputes were central concerns in early
modern philosophy from Descartes up to Kant, and we can find both epistemologically
and metaphysically motivated versions of idealism in this period. We have briefly noted
that Kant’s transcendental idealism is perhaps less than perfectly named, but I now want
to argue that in German Idealism in general (though I will focus solely on Hegel) the
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realism/idealism/materialism  contrast  gets  complicated  enough  that  it  is  far  from
obvious that it remains a genuine contrast between opposing metaphysical views.
18 First off, we need to recognize in Hegel’s philosophy the significance of the distinction
between subjective spirit and absolute spirit. There is, in Hegel’s view, no reality external
to absolute spirit, but there is a great deal of the real world that is quite independent of
subjective spirit (and subjective spirits).
19 Let us also be clear that Hegel is an epistemological realist. That is, he certainly believes
that individual subjective spirits – people like you and me – know facts and objects that
exist quite independently of them. To the extent that Hegel is, indeed, an idealist, his
idealism is not motivated by any skepticism about our ability to know material reality or
things external to our mind.
20 The principal Hegelian doctrine we need to understand to make some further progress in
thinking about Hegelian idealism in this context is the proclamation that “everything
hangs on apprehending and expressing the truth not merely as substance but also equally
as subject” (PhG ¶17). This sounds like Hegel is just picking up the concept of substance
and adding to the idea that substance is what there primarily is the further qualification
that it is subject as well – but, of course, this means radically re-thinking the notion of
substance.
21 Before  the  Post-Kantians,  it  was  easy  to  think  of  substance  merely  as  something
underlying and supporting the properties that  inhere in it.  Those properties may be
inactive,  like  extension,  or  active,  like  thinking.  As  I’ve  mentioned,  Leibniz  was
committed to the fundamentally active nature of substance, and in that, he prefigured
the Post-Kantians. Kantian (phenomenal) substance is matter, but he thought of matter
along Boscovichian lines, that is, in terms of centers of attractive and repulsive forces,
and thus not as primarily passive.7 For most of the early modern period, substance as
such had no particular material (that is, non-formal) characteristic. That is what makes
Locke’s characterization of it as a “something I know not what” trenchant.8
22 Hegel’s dictum that substance is subject puts a very different face on the matter. For he
does not mean subject in the sense of the subject of a judgment, but in the sense of the
subject who judges. And his conception of subjects of judgment and experience is not a
conception  of  some  ‘inner  space’  through  which  various  otherwise  unconnected
representations, whether impressions or ideas, parade. Taking a clue from Kant’s notion
of a unity of apperception, Hegel thinks of a subject as an active unifying of multiple
items (some of which are indeed representations) received, recollected, generated, and
even rejected by it. These items, however, are themselves dependent on their occurrence
within the unity of the subject: they cannot be intuitions, representations, or thoughts
prior to or independent from their place in the overall process of self-unification of the
subject, which self-unification is not independent from its fit within a larger environment
or context. Because the internal states and the external actions of subjects can be what
they truly are only within the context of their overall unification, which itself produces
the  subject,  Hegel  thinks  of  subjects  as  self-realizing  agencies.  But  finite  individual
subjects  are  not  capable  of  self-realization all  on their  own.  The  particular  unifying
activities engaged in by the various subjective spirits make full sense only within a larger
unifying activity that occurs at a level above that of the individual subjective spirit. In
fact, there are several levels here: individual subjective spirits make sense only insofar as
they embody the unifying practices of social community, and the whole shebang, Hegel
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holds, makes sense only as a part and aspect of the self-realizing activity of Absolute
Spirit.  Hegel’s  criterion of  being is  self-realization,  and the Absolute is  the ultimate,
cannot-fail self-realizer.
23 Hegel thus turns out to be an absolute idealist because reality itself has the kind of being
that minds possess. This is not because minds, that is, subjective spirits, are all that really
exist, but because reality – everything that is – makes sense, is what it is, as an element in
a mind-like structure. But in that case the real/ideal contrast is, essentially, overcome;
that is, it is no longer a consequential distinction. The Hegelian view also defangs the
contrast between idealism and materialism. Materialists, Hegel thinks, are too focused on
what things are made of – but he does not deny that people and communities exist in
complex dispositions of material  things.  Just as Aristotle thought that forms must be
realized in matter, Hegel believes that it is necessary that the Absolute realize itself in or
through a material nature.
24 I  have  described  elsewhere  some  of  the  commonalities  shared  by  Hegel  and  the
pragmatists.9 These include an endorsement of epistemological realism, a rejection of the
nexus of doctrines we can call “Cartesianism,” a rejection of the apriori, the employment
of a rich conception of experience, an inferentialist/functionalist theory of concepts, the
sociality of reason, and, last but not least, an emphasis on centrality of agency expressed
within an external, spatio-temporal world. The discussion here of Hegel’s deconstruction
of the realism/idealism/materialism distinction can be added to the list of what he shares
with the pragmatists. Despite all these shared commitments, Hegel is not a pragmatist. I
go into more detail in the article mentioned above, but for our purposes the relevant
difference concerns the status of the ideal. For Hegel the ideal is the real; the pragmatists,
in  contrast,  the  notion of  the  real  is  itself  an  ideal.  Hegel’s  worldview is  ultimately
teleological at its very heart; nature is there for the sake of spirit. The telos recognized by
the pragmatists emerges from the blind operations of nature; spirit, if we can call it such,
emerges from nature, but does not itself draw nature into being.
 
5. Pragmatism, The Real, and The Ideal
25 There are plenty of references to realism, idealism, materialism and the like among the
pragmatists. But, given their rather ginger attitude towards metaphysics generally, the
references are almost never straightforward endorsements or rejections. I  suggest we
look, not at what they say about the ‘isms,’ but about reality itself. Peirce starts off with a
fairly traditional approach to reality: “we may define the real as that whose characters
are independent of what anybody may think them to be” (Peirce, CP 5.405). But when
combined with the pragmatic maxim,10 this definition takes on a different aspect: “The
opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean
by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would
explain reality” (Peirce, CP 5.407).
26 It is worth reflecting a bit on this explanation of reality. In the first few parts of this
paper I discussed the framework within which the early modern thinkers argued about
realism and idealism. Note that this framework is missing in Peirce’s dictum. Peirce has
moved  well  beyond  the  “new  way  of  ideas”  that  dominated  early  modern  Western
philosophy from Descartes up to Kant. Peirce does not adopt the Cartesian assumption
that  we  know  our  own  mental  states  first  and  best  or  that  we  have  some  direct,
transparent, and incorrigible cognitive relation to our own mental states. He has a much
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more sophisticated understanding of what is involved in the notion of representationality
and the conditions for being a representation of something. Furthermore, the notion of
substance never rears its head; the issue is not what things are “made out of” or what
kind of thing ultimately has which properties, or what the fundamental nature of the
substance(s) of the world is. The real is what we represent, the object of representing, and
the representings are themselves real only to the degree they also are objects of the fated
final opinion.
27 One thing to note about Peirce’s characterizations is that realism pretty much falls out of
his position automatically.11 The real is the object of our representations – this means
that there could hardly fail be something real, unless our representations turn out not to
be representations at all and have no objects whatsoever. Of course, Peirce does not mean
that the real is the object of just any or all our representations. It is the object of just those
that are the enduring product of inquiry, those that are responsive and responsible to
sensory experience as well as some other cognitive constraints. We can tell whatever
stories  we  want;  we  can  entertain  concepts  and  thoughts  of  all  kinds,  but  we  are
committed to accept as representations of the real only those beliefs that get fixed as a
result of the practice of inquiry, properly conducted. And once we’ve gotten clear that
ideas or representations, as the medium of thinking, are not thereby also always the object
of  thought (though they may also sometimes be the object  of  thought),  there is  little
temptation left to believe that ideas are all that exist. 
28 Still, it seems Peirce’s characterization of the real cannot be divorced from the epistemic
or the mental. The tie to the epistemic, however, is not in virtue of any connection to
certainty, intuitive truth, or revelation, but simply by a connection to truth and the idea
that there are proper ways or methods by which to seek the truth. But to be clear, the
connection to truth does not itself support any kind of idealistic reading. Is there an
idealism hidden in the idea that something is “fated” to be agreed to by all who inquire,
because there would have to be some hidden intellectual agency controlling such fates?
There is no reason to believe that what Peirce has in mind is any more portentious than
what is going one when one says “Well, they’re bound to find out sooner or later that
their boy has stopped going to classes and run off with the circus.” 
29 Peirce’s characterization of the real is tied to the mental because it refers to opinion and
representation.  These  are  the  proper  subjects  of  the  truth  predicate.  What  is  most
striking, however, is that both truth and reality, in Peirce’s explanation, are regulative
ideals. Truth is not a thing and it is not a relation, not even of correspondence. It is the
general aim of inquiry, and its particulars are identified by inquiry properly conducted;
that is, it is belief properly fixed. Thus, coming into possession of the truth (at least with
any  reliability)  depends  on  proper  conduct  or  practice:  that  is  a  basic  tenet  of
pragmatism. ‘Methods’ such as revelation or authoritative pronouncement turn out not
to be proper forms of the conduct of inquiry.
30 Frankly, it has never made much sense to me that pragmatism has been accused of falling
into idealism. But we can reconstruct what some of the reasoning must have been. One
argument is an argument from historical influences: Peirce was expressly influenced by
Kant and admits as well to influences from Schelling and Hegel.12 They are all idealists of
some stripe, so Peirce is as well. A similar argument might apply to Dewey, given his
Hegelian roots. But such arguments are notoriously weak: Students, unlike apples, often
do fall far from the tree, and it is a good thing too – otherwise philosophy could never
really evolve.
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31 A different argument would rely on the fact that reality is defined in terms of truth and
representation, which are, in turn, regulative ideals. Because of this, it might look like our
mental states and activities play an important constitutive role in reality. But it is, of
course, far from Peirce’s (and from Dewey’s) mind that we somehow constitute reality (as
opposed  to  experience)  by  representing  it  in  some  particular  way.  The  pragmatist
believes  that,  as  far  as  epistemology  goes,  our  minds  are  fitted  to  the  world  by  a
combination of evolution and good epistemic practice. The pragmatist does not believe
that, epistemologically, the world is fitted to, much less made up from, our minds.13 
 
6. Pragmatism’s Evolutionary Step
32 The influence of  idealism on pragmatism cannot be denied.  A modicum of  reflection
quickly  reveals  several  central  tenets  of  (particularly  German)  idealism  that  the
pragmatists  accepted  and  (mostly)  made  their  own.  I  mentioned  above  (1)  an
endorsement of epistemological realism, (2) a rejection of the nexus of doctrines we can
call “Cartesianism,” (3) a rejection of the apriori, (4) the employment of a rich conception
of experience, (5) an inferentialist/functionalist theory of concepts, (6) the sociality of
reason, and, last but not least, (7) an emphasis on centrality of agency expressed within
an external, spatio-temporal world. I would add here (8) articulated holisms of concept
and justification.
33 I have discussed these connections between Hegel and the pragmatists elsewhere.14 So I
will  not go into the details  of  each connection here.  Rather,  I  want to make a more
general observation. At a level of high abstraction, we can say that what is shared by the
German Idealists and the pragmatists is a commitment to the priority of system. This
separates them decisively from the empiricist tradition, at least through Mill  and his
godson, Russell. Atomistic approaches to problems have proven very productive in the
natural sciences, and this has been a steady source of inspiration for standard forms of
empiricism, which held on to the idea that knowledge could be acquired in piecemeal,
independent  atoms  and  then  assembled  and  elaborated  into  the  structure  we  call
empirical knowledge. The empiricists also held that metaphysics, to the extent that it was
possible at all, must also be a structure of atoms and molecules.
34 Late idealistic thought is a reaction against the overweening atomism of the empiricists.
Things  do  not  make  sense  independently  of  some  context.  Kant  recognized  that
representations, in particular, have sense only in the context of a whole representational
system, and this imposes certain constraints on anything that counts as a representation.
The whole “new way of ideas” blithely assumed that ideas were somehow intrinsically
representational: what they represented, their ‘content,’ was somehow built right into
their  fabric without regard to their  relations to the things they represented (if  such
things existed at all) or even, in the case of simple ideas, their relations to other ideas.
When Kant asked the question, “What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we
call ‘representation’ to the object?,”15 he moved beyond the new way of ideas and opened
up a new field of inquiry that we are still plowing. Kant saw that the representationality
of mental acts depended crucially on their bearing systematic relations to other mental
acts; by the time we reach Hegel that insight has been extended. Our ability to think
depends not only on our thoughts bearing systematic relations to other mental acts of
ours,  but also on their bearing systematic relations to the mental  acts of  others and
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systematic  relations  more  generally  to  the  world  within  which  the  whole  shebang
proceeds.
35 Kant sees a connection between systematicity and design, but it is not a straightforward
connection. He does not think that we can infer from the apparent systematicity of the
world to its having been a designed creation. But he does think that we need to think of
the  world  as  if  it  is  designed  in  order  to  be  able  to  discover  the  often-masked
systematicity that must be there if we are to be able to cognize the world. The idea of a
well-designed world functions as a regulative ideal informing, inspiring, and constraining
our cognition. 
36 This complex of ideas undergoes further transformation in Hegel. He has, for instance, no
patience  with  regulative  ideals:  A purpose  that  is  forever  and  in  principle  beyond
achievement is no real purpose at all.  Hegel also does not draw the same connection
between systematicity  and design that  Kant  does.  Kant  thinks  that  design has  to  be
someone’s design, the creation of a thinking thing. Hegel’s more naturalistic (and more
Aristotelian) interpretation of teleology accepts the notion that there can be and is a
natural teleology that is not a form of trying to realize some desire, given one’s beliefs,
but something more primitive and more widespread: self-realization, as in an organism.16
Hegel’s notion of self-realization, however, is still modeled on Kant’s conception of the
self-constituting unity of apperception; that is, the model on which Hegel conceives the
overall systematic unity necessarily found in a world capable of being known from within
remains the unity of a mind, now magnified to the ultimate self-realizer, the Absolute.
37 I  think the pressures not only to recognize the necessity of systematicity but also to
account for it operate just as strongly in Peirce and Dewey as they do in Kant and Hegel.
Peirce  is  certainly  even  clearer  than  Kant  and  Hegel  were  about  the  need  for
systematicity if one is going to make sense of the representationality of thought and our
capacity to know the world within which we live. But the model for the nature and origin
of that systematicity shifts significantly. Peirce’s new model, one not available to either
Kant  or  Hegel,  was  also  adopted  by  Chauncey  Wright  and  picked  up  by  the  other
pragmatists: evolution, not mind. Darwin displaces God, not through apotheosis, but by
giving us a model of designerless design that makes the hypothesis of God, as Laplace
famously pointed out, not necessary, even if one recognizes the need for systematicity in
human knowledge and the world it knows.
38 One might  think that  Darwin’s  model  has  distinctive limits:  doesn’t  it  apply  only  to
organisms? If that is the case, then it will not account for a more general systematicity in
the  world,  for  the  realm of  the  organic  is  quite  limited,  as  far  as  we know.  Peirce,
however, applies the model far more broadly, telling us that “the only possible way of
accounting for the laws of nature and for uniformity in general is to suppose them results
of evolution” (Peirce, CP 6.13). This remark is not a one-off in Peirce’s work. He tells us
elsewhere that he has been “led to the hypothesis that the laws of the universe have been
formed under a universal tendency of all things toward generalization and habit-taking”
(Peirce,  CP 7.515),  which he argues is  precisely such as to lend itself  to evolutionary
development  over  time.  Peirce  was  unabashed  in  making  this  grand  metaphysical
hypothesis,  and  I  don’t  know  of  similar  speculations  on  the  part  of  other  classical
pragmatists,  but  the  pressures  Peirce  is  responding  to  in  speculating  about  the
explanation of the uniformity and systematicity of nature are, it seems clear to me, just
those that drove Kant to the Ideas of Reason and Hegel to the Absolute.
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39 But  what  a  difference!  In  Peirce’s  picture,  things  emerge  from  inexorable,  natural
processes, not from the plans or designs of some super-powerful intentional agent, and
not from some divine but organic process that leaves us wondering where the original
seed might have come from. Peirce’s view is not in any interesting sense an idealism, even
though it preserves a great many of the features characteristic of German Idealism. But in
Peirce’s version, these features are not accounted for by some top-down explanation that
presupposes a grand unifier; they arise bottom-up from smaller, constrained, interactive
processes filtered through natural selection. The unity arises from the process itself; it
does not lie in any goal or final cause.
40 It  is  also revealing to recognize that the shift  to evolution as the systematizer helps
account for the emphasis on practice in pragmatism. The system of the world is not pre-
ordained, either by God’s plans or by independent, pre-existing metaphysical natures: it
must  be created and realized in  medias  res,  as  it  were,  emerging in history from the
simplest of beginnings and elaborating itself into the world and us, the knowers of that
world. The pragmatic vision is a vision in which activity moves to the forefront in every
case,  for  the world,  like us humans,  is  busy making itself  in the course of  time.  The
pragmatist’s  image  of  a  self-constituting  world  containing  self-constituting  thinking
beings capable of cognizing that world is not, in my view, all that different from the
Hegelian view, but the historical and causal underpinnings at work in the processes of
self-constitution are so very different.
41 I have argued that by the early XIXth century, idealism as a doctrine no longer stood in
clear contrast to its nominal rivals, realism and materialism. But that does not mean that
the terms and the contrasts between them became meaningless. There is a good sense
and good reason to call Hegel an idealist; there is equally good sense and reason to deny
that label to Peirce and Dewey, despite the fact that the larger structures of their views
are deeply similar. There is a problem with such descriptions only when one loses sight of
the complexity such simple terms often mask. 
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NOTES
1. See for instance, Colvin 1905; Ryder 1988. Peirce himself tells us “the one intelligible theory of
the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind” (CP 6.25).
2. The distinction I draw here might be similar to the distinction Dewey hints at in “Experience
and Objective  Idealism” between epistemologically-based and cosmologically-based idealisms.
But Dewey doesn’t say enough to be sure of the extent to which our distinctions coincide. See
Dewey 1906.
3. This  characterization  can  often  be  found  in  the  more  popular  references,  such  as  the
Encyclopaedia  Brittanica or  Wikipedia.  See,  e.g.,  [ britannica.com/topic/subjective-idealism];  [
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjective_idealism];  [philosophynotes.net/philosophy/idealism/
idealism-forms-of-idealism-with-criticisms/132].
4. Plato. The Sophist,  cited by the traditional Stephanus numbers. The translation in the Loeb
Classical Library is “For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else than
power” (Plato 1921).
5. For instance “The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the
finite has no veritable being” (SL 154; 5, 172). Of course, the full story in the case of Hegel – why
self-realization  is  the  mark  of  true  being  –  is  vastly  more  complex  than this,  but  as  a  first
approximation, we can live with this characterization. 
6. I will just ignore the apparent separability of active reason for the moment.
7. See, for instance, Buroker 1972; Warren 2001.
8. Locke (1975, Bk. II, Ch. 23, §2).
9. deVries (in press).
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10. “Consider  what  effects,  that  might  conceivably  have  practical  bearings,  we  conceive  the
object  of  our  conception to  have.  Then,  our  conception of  these  effects  is  the  whole  of  our
conception of the object”(Peirce, CP 5.402).
11. For a fuller view of Peirce’s realism, including its historical development, see Susan Haack
(1976: 241):  “Peirce frequently stresses that Reality is independent of human beliefs about it.
Nonetheless, he manifests some embarrassment with his notion of Reality, since, as he is well
aware, he can not prove that an external independent Reality exists. As he puts it: since he uses
the idea of Reality as the foundation for his theory of inquiry, he cannot use that theory show
that there is such a thing as Reality.”
12. For example, Peirce mentions that he “devoted two hours a day to the study of Kant’s Critic of
Pure Reason for more than three years, until [he] almost knew the whole book by heart, and had
critically examined every section of it” (CP 1.4). He also makes the explicit claims that (1) “My
philosophy  resuscitates  Hegel,  though  in  a  strange  costume”  (CP  1.42),  and  (2)  “I  am  a
Schellingian, of some stripe” (CP 6.605).
13. But, of course there is a sense, and a perfectly good one, in which the world gets fitted to our
minds – we are agents who seek to conform the world to our wishes (or at least our needs): that is
the practical sphere. It is clear to me that, for the pragmatist, the practical sphere is finite and
contained  within  a  wider  reality.  We  do  not  constitute  reality  altogether  by  means  of  our
practical activity, but presuppose access to an already constituted reality within which we strive
to achieve ourselves and our projects. Thus, I take it that there is no argument from a pragmatic
view of our activity as agents to the claim that pragmatism is a form of idealism.
14. deVries (in press).
15. Letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772. In Kant (1999: 133).
16. I have laid out my interpretation of Kant’s and Hegel’s differing approaches to teleology in
deVries 1991.
ABSTRACTS
Pragmatism has ties to Idealism; it has even been accused of being a form of idealism. I tell a
story about the changing nature of idealism that makes sense of its relationship to pragmatism
without  threatening  to  collapse  the  two.  My  story  is  a  genealogy  that  begins  well  before
pragmatism shows up. Pragmatism has very little in common with the subjective idealism of
Berkeley  or  the  problematic  idealism  of  Descartes;  the  differences  between  idealism  and
pragmatism  get  blurred  only  because  idealism  underwent  an  evolution  transforming  it  into
something primed to influence and maybe bleed into pragmatism. It was, according to my story,
the  evolved  idealism developed  in  Germany between 1781  and 1831  that  contributed  to  the
formation and development of pragmatism. Yet pragmatism is a large evolutionary step away
from idealism,  however  much it  retains  and utilizes  some of  the  strengths  of  late  idealistic
thought.
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